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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LINDA H. JENSEN, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
No.20010721-CA 
vs. 
JAMES T. JENSEN, Argument Priority 15 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, PRESIDING 
JURISDICTION 
Linda H. Jensen ("Wife") appeals the Second Supplemental Decree of Divorce en-
tered June 22, 2001. This Court's jurisdiction is based upon Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Did the trial court err in summarily reversing its decision that an unequal 
property division was equitable in this case, without applying a correct legal standard as 
to the existence of "exceptional circumstances" and without making appropriate findings 
supporting its decision? 
B. In failing to consider the issue of property division in its entirety following 
remand from the Court of Appeals, did the trial court err in treating marital property as 
Husband's separate property, and thus fail to divide the marital estate in half? 
C. Did the trial court err in vacating in its entirety its award of alimony to 
Wife, and in failing to apply an appropriate legal standard to the issue of alimony? 
D. Did the trial court err in attributing investment income to Wife? 
E. Did the trial court err in ordering a refund of alimony previously paid? 
Issues D and E are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Cummings v. Cummings, 
821 P.2d 472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Issues A, B, and C present questions of law and are 
reviewed for correctness. Bingham v. Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
The issues were inherently part of the remand instructions from the Court of Appeals; 
however, they were also preserved at R. 524-40 and 571-75. 
GOVERNING LAW 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative or of central importance, except as follows. At the 
time of trial, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 provided in pertinent part: 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
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(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, exist-
ing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsec-
tion (7)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable prin-
ciples and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that ex-
isted at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have 
been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard 
of living that existed at the time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the 
parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, 
that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining 
the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly en-
hanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may 
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding 
alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and 
no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may con-
sider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the mar-
riage. 
1997 Utah Laws ch. 232. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
This divorce case was tried to Judge David S. Young of the Third District Court 
on October 28-30 and November 12, 1997. The court issued its Memorandum Decision, 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Supplemental Decree of Di-
vorce on January 19, 1999. (R. 196-246.) Wife appealed. (R. 300-02.) The Court of 
Appeals issued its decision July 7, 2000. 2000 UT App. 213 (unpublished). The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's exclusion of certain property from the marital estate, 
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but vacated the final property division and the award of alimony, and remanded those is-
sues to the trial court for further consideration and additional findings. 
In the initial decree, the trial court awarded some property acknowledged to be 
marital to Husband as separate property. This was one of the reasons the court awarded 
more than half of the remaining diminished "marital" estate to Wife. On remand follow-
ing appeal, the court changed the property division to 50/50, but failed to restore that 
marital property to the marital estate before making its calculation. In addition, the court 
failed to properly consider the issue of "exceptional circumstances" that had been re-
manded to it by the Court of Appeals, and simply divided the modified marital estate 
50/50. 
Further, the trial court vacated the award of $4,000 per month alimony, basing its 
decision in part on putative investment income of 7.5 percent that the court assumed, 
without evidence, could be earned on assets awarded to Wife. Those assets included 
$125,000 that was paid as alimony under an agreement prior to entry of the final decree 
of divorce, that the trial court ordered refunded to Husband. The Second Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce was entered June 22, 2001. (R. 625-27.) Wife filed her Notice of Ap-
peal July 20, 2001. (R. 630.) 
B. Statement of Facts. 
James T. Jensen ("Husband") and Linda H. Jensen ("Wife") were married in 1970 
in Utah and had three children during the marriage, two of whom had reached the age of 
majority at the time of trial, and the other of whom was still in high school. (R. 1-2, R. 
323 at pp. 5, 12-13.) 
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Wife was 51 years old at the time of trial. She attended college for three years be-
fore the marriage but upon Husband's request did not work outside the home during most 
of the parties' marriage. (R. 323 at pp. 6, 29, 120; R. 324 at p. 195.) In accord with his 
wishes, instead of working outside the home, Wife focused on maintaining the parties' 
domestic affairs and caring for their children. (R. 109; R. 323 at pp. 44-45.) The only 
exception to this is that she worked part-time from 1985 to 1990 at Husband's law office 
performing clerical work. (R. 323 at pp. 43, 89; R. 324 at pp. 196-97.) 
Husband was 57 years old at the time of trial. He was admitted to the Utah State 
Bar in 1969, one year before the marriage. (R. 323 at p. 136.) He practiced law with his 
father, Therald Jensen, in Price, Utah, until 1990, when he became in-house counsel for 
Savage Industries. (R. 323 at pp. 7, 45.) He is currently Executive Vice President and 
General Counsel of Savage Industries. (R. 221.) 
1. The Marital Estate. 
Over the course of the twenty-seven year marriage, the parties acquired substantial 
assets and maintained a high standard of living. (R. 109; R. 323 at pp. 55-57.) They re-
ceived property and other assets, through gift or inheritance, from each of their parents. 
(R. 109.) Wife's father gave the parties the land on which their first home was built, and 
Husband's father was the source of some of the ranch properties and part of the 88,493 
shares of Zions Bank stock that was at issue between the parties. (R. 323 at pp. 37-38). 
These assets were commingled between the parties. 
The ranch properties consist of three related assets: T-N Company, T-N Ranches, 
and Moynier. T-N Company is a partnership owned by Husband and his two brothers, 
and it is the operating entity for the ranching property, owning cattle, equipment, and ma-
chinery associated with the ranch. (R. 323 at pp. 148-49.) T-N Ranches is a partnership 
owned by Husband and his three siblings; it owns some 35,000 acres of land in Carbon 
County, Utah, along with associated water rights and grazing permits. (R. 119; R. 323 at 
p. 164; Defendant's Exhibit 39; Plaintiffs Exhibit 11.) The Moynier property consists of 
21,400 acres of land in Carbon, Duchesne, and Utah Counties, together with state and 
federal grazing permits covering some 100,000 acres of land, title to which is in the name 
of Husband and his two brothers. (R. 323 at pp. 157-62; R. 324 at pp. 180-81; Defen-
dant's Exhibits 28 and 30.) T-N Company leases the entire T-N Ranches landholding 
and the Moynier property plus grazing rights for a nominal sum of $1,000 per year. (R. 
323 at p. 168.) 
a. The Moynier Ranch. 
The Moynier Ranch consists of 21,400 deeded acres of ranch land in Carbon, 
Duchesne and Utah Counties, as well as over 100,000 acres of federal and state grazing 
permits. (R. 323 at pp. 157-62; R. 324 at pp. 180-81; Defendant's Exhibit 30) It was ac-
quired in 1976, well into the marriage, for approximately $827,000. The $25,000 down 
payment came from the parties' marital funds. (R. 82; R. 224.) The court found that the 
installment payments, were "paid for through the ranching operations or T.N. Company." 
(R. 223.) Husband admitted, however, that $148,000 of the purchase price did not come 
from sales or exchanges of separate property. (R. 323 at p. 182.) 
Husband would not express an opinion on the value of the Moynier Ranch, but his 
expert valued the parties' one-third interest at $333,679. (R. 323 at p. 173; R. 324 at 
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p. 126.) The expert's opinion was based on an estimate from a real estate appraiser, Sam 
Sanders, whose wife works for Husband at Savage Industries. (R. 325 at p. 96.) How-
ever, the Utah County Assessor valued the Utah County portion of the Moynier property 
alone at $3,370,000, and Husband did not protest this valuation. (R. 324 at p. 181; R. 325 
at p. 84.) Wife's expert valued the Moynier Ranch at $5,375,000, and the parties' one-
third interest at $1,791,667. (R. 324 at p. 35.) The trial court did not resolve the valua-
tion dispute. 
b. T-N Ranches. 
T-N Ranches is a corporation formed in 1983. It owns the title to ranch property 
and grazing permits T-N Company uses at a token rental. (R. 323 at pp. 7, 166, 168.) 
Husband successfully contended at trial that the parties' 25 percent interest in T-N 
Ranches was his separate property. 
Wife's expert valued the parties' 25% interest in T-N Ranches at $1,312,500. 
(R. 323 at pp. 11, 164; R. 324 at pp. 32-33.) Husband's expert valued the parties' interest 
in T-N Ranches at $127,208 (which translates to a land value of $37 per acre), prior to 
application of an alleged minority interest discount. (R. 324 at pp. 131-32, 152-56.) The 
trial court did not resolve the valuation issue. 
c. T-N Company. 
T-N Company was formed in 1969 by Husband's father, Therald Jensen, and his 
three sons James, Butch and Jerry. (R. 78.) It initially owned construction equipment 
and cattle. (R. 323 at pp. 7, 35.) T-N Company still operates as a cattle business, but in 
1997 much of the construction equipment was sold for $900,000. (R. 323 at p. 149.) Out 
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of the remaining assets of T-N Company, the remaining equipment is worth approxi-
mately $600,000, and the remaining cattle and other livestock are worth approximately 
$1.1 million. (R. 323 at pp. 150-53.) T-N Company also owns several trucks and trailers 
and a shop building. (R. 325 at 18; Defendant's Exhibit 12.) 
T-N Company leases over 35,000 acres of land, plus grazing permits, from T-N 
Ranches; and the 21,400 Moynier property and 100,000 acres of grazing rights, at the re-
duced rate of $1,000 per year for the entire property, which works out to 1.8 cents per 
acre for the owned property and nothing for the leases and permits. (R. 323 at p. 168.) 
According to the tax returns and equity accounts for T-N Company, Husband 
owns 49.29% of the company, and his two brothers own the remainder in equal shares. 
(R. 79; R. 324 at pp. 22-24, 80.) However, Husband claims the brothers made an oral 
"agreement" at some point that they each really own one-third of the company. (R. 324 
at p. 108.) His two brothers receive yearly salaries from T-N Company, yet Husband has 
never drawn a salary from T-N Company, even though he spent as much time on the 
ranching operations as they did throughout the parties' marriage. (R. 323 at pp. 126, 148; 
R. 324 at pp. 199-202.) He also performed free legal work for T-N Company. (R. 324 at 
p. 202.) 
Over the years, T-N Company required major cash subsidy in order to continue 
operating. In the early years, that subsidy came from Husband's father, who loaned a 
significant amount to T-N Company in exchange for promissory notes from the company. 
(R. 325 at pp. 87-88). Husband's father later gifted his interest in the promissory notes 
separately to Husband and Wife in $10,000 annual increments each as part of his estate 
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planning. (R. 325 at pp. 87-88). By 1993, T-N Company owed Husband $126,931 and 
Wife $30,000. (R. 324 at p. 51). It owed Husband's law office $78,348. (R. 324 at 
p. 51.) It also owed $85,031 to Malpaso, a trucking company which was formed during 
the marriage and which was for that reason clearly a marital asset even though the stock 
was in Husband's name. (R. 323 at pp. 34-35, 174-75.) The funds Malpaso and Wife 
lent to T-N Company were used to purchase heavy machinery for T-N Company, which 
machinery was then used as collateral by the company to secure financing for additional 
growth and development. (R. 118.) In addition, Malpaso, a marital asset, was com-
pletely absorbed into T-N Company. 
In 1993, Wife's $30,000 in notes were converted into equity in T-N Company. 
(R. 324 at pp. 51-53; R. 325 at pp. 87-88.) The marital estate was never reimbursed for 
the other debts, which were absorbed as equity in T-N Company as well. 
In early 1996, the parties sold $65,000 of the Zions Bank stock they had acquired 
during the marriage and transferred the proceeds into T-N Company. (R. 323 at pp. 66, 
81-82; R. 325 at p. 48; Plaintiffs Exhibit 7.) 
The parties presented different values for T-N Company at trial. According to 
Wife's expert Deane Smith, T-N Company is worth $2.2 million, and Husband's 49.29% 
share is worth $1,066,000. (R. 323 at p. 132; R. 324 at p. 23.) Husband's expert Derk 
Rasmussen valued T-N Company at $1.4 million. (R. 324 at pp. 140- 41.) The trial court 
did not resolve the valuation issue. 
2. The Trial Court's Property Division 
Depending upon which party's valuation of the ranching properties is accepted, 
the parties' assets were worth between $8 and $10 million at the time of trial. Initially, 
the trial court recognized that there were significant difficulties in sorting out the separate 
property from the marital property. Wife contended that all of the parties' property was 
marital, having either been acquired during the marriage, gifted into joint ownership dur-
ing the marriage, or commingled with marital property. Husband contended that 58,352 
shares of Zions Bank stock, worth $3,027,010, was his separate property. He also con-
tended that all of the ranch properties, worth between $1.8 and $4.2 million, were sepa-
rate property. 
The trial court for the most part agreed with Husband's characterization of the 
stock and ranch property as separate property. However, the court acknowledged that 
some marital assets had been commingled with the ranch properties. In part because of 
that fact, and in part because of the generally unequal financial position of the parties af-
ter a 27-year marriage, the trial court divided the parties' property as follows in the initial 
decree: 
Marital Residence 
Mortgage 
Furniture 
30,141 shares of Zions Bank stock 
Price law office building 
Vehicles 
Certificate of deposit 
1996 tax refund 
John Hancock life policy 
IRAs 
Savage pension 
Mantlepiece 
Value 
$ 771,000.00 
-203,994.00 
75,000.00 
1,563,564.00 
153,326.00 
77,611.00 
28,925.00 
21,543.00 
55,546.00 
33,085.00 
206,774.27 
10,000.00 
To Husband 
0.00 
-203,994.00 
0.00 
781,782.00 
153,326.00 
35,011.00 
0.00 
21,058.00 
0.00 
16,543.00 
103,387.00 
10,000.00 
To Wife 
771,000.00 
0.00 
75,000.00 
781,782.00 
0.00 
42,291.00 
29,500.00 
0.00 
55,546.00 
16,543.00 
103,387.00 
0.00 
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40 acre parcel 45,000.00 0.00 45,000.00 
Spring Glen home 169,374.72 84,687.00 84,687.00 
Marital property $3,006,754.99 $1,001,800.00 $2,004,736.00 
Separate property 7,227,000.00 7,227,000.00 O00 
TOTAL $10.233.754.99 $8.228.800.00 $2.004.736.00 
Husband challenged the unequal division of marital property on appeal. The trial 
court's justification for the unequal division was: 
Based on the Court's general equitable power, the Court finds that certain of these 
assets should not be divided equally to the parties, even though they were acquired 
during the course of the marriage and have been determined by the Court to con-
stitute in part the marital estate. (R. 213.) 
As noted above, there was significant and undisputed evidence that marital property had 
been commingled with the ranch properties. Rather than sort out the details of those 
transfers, the trial court relied upon the unequal division of property as rendering the final 
outcome "equitable." For example, the court found that $25,000 appeared to have come 
from marital funds for the purchase of the Moynier Ranch. Rather than allocate that 
amount to Wife, the court stated: 
The Court believes that it remains fair and equitable to allow James to retain the 
whole of the Jensen Brothers property assets and interests as separate property, 
and believes that an equitable offset of the $25,000 which, if it came from marital 
funds, would be subject to sharing, has been equitably dealt with hereafter in rela-
tion to the other assets of the marital estate. (R. 201.) 
Similar reasoning caused the court to ultimately ignore substantial evidence of commin-
gling, because the court believed that the final outcome would be equitable. 
The Court of Appeals decided that the trial court's explanation for the unequal di-
vision of property was insufficient, and remanded the case for additional findings: 
The trial court's findings on remand must be "'sufficiently detailed and include 
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on 
[this] factual issue was reached.'" 2000 UT App 213 at pp. 3-4. 
_i i_ 
On remand, instead of detailing the reasons for its previous decision, the trial court 
changed its decision, awarding Husband an additional $501,468 of property from the di-
minished marital estate that had previously been found by the court. This equalized the 
table of property the court had initially generated, but failed to remedy the award of mari-
tal property to Husband as part of the ranch properties. The court expressed the view that 
the Court of Appeals had imposed a mathematical approach which resulted in an unfair 
outcome. It noted that there was no appellate guidance on the meaning of "exceptional 
circumstances," and concluded that exceptional circumstances justifying an unequal divi-
sion of marital property did not exist. In doing so, it applied a dictionary definition of 
"exceptional:" 
The Court finds that while neither party has cited to the Court precedent de-
fining the terms "exceptional circumstances" in the context of justification for an 
unequal division of the marital estate, clearly those terms include deviation from 
the norm, higher than average, atypical, uncommon, extraordinary, or similar 
meanings and concepts. The Court further finds that while the Petitioner has de-
tailed in her Memorandum various circumstances she deems to be exceptional, 
they do not singly or in combination justify the division of the marital estate be-
tween the parties on other than an equal basis. As such, no exceptional circum-
stances exist which would justify the division of the marital estate between the 
parties on other than an equal basis. (R. 618.) 
To accomplish the redistribution, the court made several adjustments. In the time 
between trial and remand, the marital residence had been sold and Wife had paid off the 
mortgage from the sale proceeds. The mortgage had been placed in Husband's column in 
the initial property division, so the equalizing amount of $501,468 was reduced by the 
amount of the mortgage payoff of $182,535. (R. 619.) Husband had made payments to 
Wife for the mortgage after it was paid off of $26,488, and that amount was ordered re-
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funded to Husband. The resulting amount was $345,421. The trial court then ordered 
Wife to pay Husband interest on that amount at 7.5 percent per year, or an additional 
$49,833. (R. 619-20.) Thus, the trial court ordered Wife to transfer $395,254 to Hus-
band. This was accomplished by transfer of 7,619.3542 shares of Zions Bank stock from 
Wife to Husband, leaving Wife with 7,451 shares of Zions Bank stock. (R. 620.) 
3. Alimony. 
Prior to the entry of the Supplemental Decree in January of 1999, Husband had 
voluntarily paid Wife $6,000 per month as temporary alimony pursuant to an agreement 
that relieved the parties of the necessity of having the issue of temporary alimony re-
solved by the court. By agreeing to pay $6,000 in temporary alimony in a form not tax-
able to Wife, Husband acknowledged that her living expenses were at least $6,000 per 
month, and the lower court noted this as a factor supporting alimony. (R. 215.) 
Husband's ability to pay alimony was not disputed (R. 621.) The trial court also 
had specific evidence of Wife's actual past expenses and future need before it. (Ex. P-2, 
copy incl. in R. 134, p. 2.) Although the court concluded that Wife would have invest-
ment income sufficient to meet a need of $6,000 per month, it awarded her $4,000 per 
month alimony anyway. It explained its decision on general equitable grounds rather 
than on the basis of need: 
Thus, the Court could find that the income potentially generated from the 
assets awarded to the plaintiff would be sufficient to meet her needs. However, 
this ignores the 27 year term of the marriage, and strikes the Court as fundamen-
tally inequitable when the defendant would not be required to live off of the yield 
from his assets, but has separate earned income. Assuming defendant's annual 
gross income to be approximately $195,000, that gives him a monthly gross in-
come of $16,250 per month. Defendant has been paying approximately $6,000 
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per month in temporary alimony during the parties' separation, but the plaintiff 
has been required to pay the mortgage on the Monica Cove home in the approxi-
mate amount of $2,200, so requiring the defendant to hold the plaintiff harmless 
on that mortgage, the Court finds that it is reasonable to require the defendant to 
pay alimony in the amount of $4,000 per month from November 1, 1997, until the 
defendant reaches age 65. The court notes the defendant is now just over 55, hav-
ing a birthday in February. After age 65, each party should be required to bear 
their future expenses based upon their earnings generated from assets. (Memoran-
dum Decision, R. 215-16.) 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the award of alimony because the court 
had not considered the relevant statutory factors, and remanded the case for appropriate 
analysis of those factors. 2000 UT App 213 at pp. 3-4. Once again, rather than explain-
ing its previous decision, the trial court simply abandoned it, ruling that no alimony was 
appropriate. To justify its decision, the court, without any evidentiary basis, assumed that 
Wife could earn a 7.5 percent return on $939,557.00 of assets she was awarded: 
The financial condition of the Petitioner with an award to her of over 
$1,500,000.00 and the earnings on $939,557.00 at .075 percent per annum, which 
represents the amount of assets awarded to her in the Memorandum Decision plus 
the proceeds received from the sale of the Monica Cove residence and less 
$395,254.00 awarded to Respondent, will produce income to her of $5,872.00 per 
month. Further, the Court finds that earnings at the federal minimum wage stan-
dard should she desire to accept employment which the Court finds she will not be 
required to do will produce to the Petitioner $893.00 per month or a total income 
of $6,765.00 per month. The Court also finds that the Petitioner's living expenses 
and financial needs and requirements after the deletion of Monica Cove residence 
previously sold and related property taxes thereon approximate $4,000.00 per 
month. As such, the Court finds that the Petitioner has not demonstrated a need 
for alimony from the Respondent. (R. 620-21.) 
The $939,557.00 figure was a total value of all of the property awarded to Wife 
that the trial court found "could be considered by the plaintiff as working assets, capable 
of generating a rate of return." (R. 238.) It was based on the following table, which 
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represents the trial court's initial allocation of assets as "working," adjusted to reflect the 
later reallocation of property (R. 236-38, 620-21): 
Value 
Excess value of marital residence $200,000.00 
Zions Bank stock 386,528.00* 
Certificate of deposit 29,500.00 
1990 BMW 750 18,366.00 
John Hancock life policy 55,546.00 
IRAs 16,543.00 
Savage pension 103,387.00 
40 acre parcel 45,000.00 
Spring Glen home proceeds 84,687.00 
TOTAL $939.557.00 
The trial court assumed that all of the foregoing assets could pay a 7.5 percent rate 
of return, which the trial court described as "average." (R. 236.) However, no evidence 
supported the putative 7.5 percent rate of return. Indeed, at the time of trial, the Zions 
Bank stock was earning only 2.2 percent, and would have had to have been sold at a sub-
stantial capital gains tax penalty if it were to be reinvested. As a practical matter, there 
was no safe investment available to Wife with that yield anywhere. Also, the retirement 
assets were not available for immediate income production and thus did not offset Wife's 
need. 
The trial court suggested that Wife should get a job and work to earn minimum 
wage, even though her lifestyle during the marriage had not required employment, and 
Husband's ability to pay alimony was not disputed. (R. 621.) Husband's post-divorce 
At the final hearing, the court reduced this amount by an additional $125,000 to effectu-
ate the refund of temporary alimony that it ordered. The reduction was accomplished by 
transfer of 2,212 shares of Zions Bank stock at $56.50 per share. Thus, the final award of 
Zions Bank stock was 5,239 shares at $51,875 per share, or $271,780. The final total of 
"working" assets was $814,557. 
_ i ^ _ 
lifestyle was substantially higher than Wife's, inasmuch as Husband was awarded some 
$8.5 million in separate and marital assets and had an income of over $200,000 per year. 
The trial court did not further explain how it concluded that Wife did not need alimony. 
Before trial, Husband had voluntarily paid Wife $6,000 per month in temporary 
alimony, which included $2,200 per month for a mortgage payment that became Hus-
band's obligation in the final decree. Thus, the pre- and post-decree alimony amounts 
were essentially equal. In its decision following remand, the trial court required Wife to 
refund to Husband $125,000 of alimony that was paid after January 19, 1999, when the 
Supplemental Decree was entered, and until July 7, 2000 when the Court of Appeals re-
manded this case for further findings on both the property division and alimony issues. 
The court held that Wife could discharge this refund obligation by transferring additional 
Zions Bank stock to Husband at a value of $56.50 per share, but in calculating Wife's 
"working assets" the court failed to adjust for the $125,000 reduction caused by the 
court's order to refund temporary alimony. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although in a divorce case the trial court "may make such orders concerning 
property distribution and alimony as are equitable," Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 
(Utah 1985), "the trial court must exercise its discretion in accordance with the standards 
that have been set by this Court." Id. In this case, the trial court has failed to follow 
those standards in several respects, and has in the process failed to give proper weight to 
the burden of proof on the issues of property division and alimony. 
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This Court instructed the trial court to explain the "exceptional circumstances" 
justifying an unequal division of the marital estate. The trial court, however, applied an 
erroneous dictionary definition of "exceptional." Under Utah law, the court is to consider 
numerous factors in fashioning an equitable property division, including "the amount and 
kind of property to be divided; whether the property was acquired before or during the 
marriage; the source of the property; the health of the parties; the parties' standard of liv-
ing, respective financial conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the duration of the mar-
riage; the children of the marriage; the parties' ages at time of marriage and of divorce; 
what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary relationship the property di-
vision has with the amount of alimony and child support to be awarded." Burke v. Burke, 
733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). The trial court did not apply those factors, finding in-
stead that "uncommon" or "extraordinary" reasons must be shown. 
The court's analysis was erroneous. The Burke factors supported the trial court's 
initial decision and the decision should have been analyzed in terms of those factors. 
There had been significant commingling of marital property with the ranch properties, 
and marital augmentation of the ranch properties, during the marriage. It was Husband's 
burden to prove the separate character of property he was awarded; it was not Wife's 
burden to disprove it. At least $500,000 of marital funds had gone into the ranching op-
erations, and the trial court erred in failing to account for those funds before dividing the 
marital estate in half. The court also erred in failing to consider the parties respective 
post-divorce financial conditions and the other factors required by Burke. 
In equalizing the previous property division, the trial court also used its 7.5 per-
cent income assumption and required Wife to refund $49,833 of "interest" on the prop-
erty she had possessed during the interim between the first and final decrees. The theory 
invoked for requiring a refund was essentially a disgorgement theory. In requiring pay-
ment of interest at 7.5 percent, engaged in speculation. The trial court failed to ascertain 
what, if anything, Wife had actually earned on the assets. 
Further, some $500,000 of marital assets had been incorporated into the ranch 
properties and awarded to Husband as part of his separate property, even though they 
were marital in nature. The initial unequal division had attempted to compensate for this 
failure to sort out the commingling of property by awarding Wife more than half of the 
remaining diminished marital estate. However, when the court adjusted the property di-
vision following remand, it failed to include those assets in the marital estate, which re-
sulted in an award of over half of the marital estate to Husband. 
On the issue of alimony, the trial court again believed that a mathematical ap-
proach to alimony was mandated, and thus failed to take into account all of the equitable 
factors that must be considered in determining alimony. It erred in attributing investment 
income of 7.5 percent to Wife. Investment income, like other forms of income, must be 
established by evidence in the record. In this case, there was no evidence in the record 
that such a rate of return was available to Wife. The only evidence in the record was that 
the one liquid asset Wife had, the Zions Bank stock, yielded only 2.2 percent, or $506 per 
month. The trial court also erroneously assumed that funds in retirement accounts would 
generate income for Wife's current support, which is not possible in a retirement account. 
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As a result, the court's decision to award no alimony was erroneous. When the 
parties were married, they enjoyed the financial security of $10 million in assets and 
Husband's income of $200,000 per year. Following the divorce, Husband continued to 
enjoy that security but Wife did not. "[T]he most important function of alimony is to 
provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed 
during marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge." English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977). Even though ability to pay was not an issue in 
this case, the parties' standards of living were not equalized and Wife's living standard 
was substantially reduced as a result of the divorce. 
Finally, the trial court erred in ordering a refund of $125,000 in alimony that Wife 
had previously received from Husband. When this case was remanded following the first 
appeal, it stood with respect to the alimony issue as it did before the trial court entered its 
alimony award. That meant that Husband's agreement to pay temporary alimony of 
$6,000 per month was reinstated. The trial court's decision was not only erroneous, but it 
placed Wife in extremely dire financial circumstances, because she did not have prior no-
tice that monies paid as alimony might not be available for consumption. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S PROPERTY DIVISION WAS BASED ON 
AN ERRONEOUS LEGAL STANDARD, FAILED TO CLASSIFY 
ASSETS CORRECTLY, AND WAS INEQUITABLE. 
A. The Trial Court Applied an Incorrect Standard in Deciding 
Whether "Exceptional Circumstances " Existed to Justify Its 
Previous Unequal Division of the Marital Estate. 
In Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court described 
the factors to be considered in fashioning an equitable property division in divorce. Al-
though the case involved the circumstances under which equity will permit the inclusion 
of separate property in the marital estate, the guiding principle applies in all property di-
vision decisions: 
In fashioning an equitable property division, trial courts need consider all of the 
pertinent circumstances. The factors generally to be considered are the amount 
and kind of property to be divided; whether the property was acquired before or 
during the marriage; the source of the property; the health of the parties; the par-
ties' standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs, and earning capac-
ity; the duration of the marriage; the children of the marriage; the parties' ages at 
time of marriage and of divorce; what the parties gave up by the marriage; and the 
necessary relationship the property division has with the amount of alimony and 
child support to be awarded. 
733 P.2d at 135 (footnotes omitted). 
In Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988), the Court noted that even 
though donated or inherited property is not subject to equitable division it may properly 
be considered as a factor in determining what constitutes an equitable division of the re-
maining property. 760 P.2d at 308. 
In this case, the court failed to apply the Burke standard. Instead, it looked up the 
word "exceptional" in the dictionary and relied on the dictionary definition. (Supp. 
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R. 51. ) In its attempt to follow the Court of Appeals' direction, the trial court gave un-
due emphasis to the meaning of the phrase "exceptional circumstances" and in the proc-
ess lost sight of the appropriate legal standard, as set forth in Burke. 
THE COURT: I would say that this case still frustrates me greatly because 
when the Court of Appeals ruled as it did, it seems to me that it's just making the 
whole thing a very mathematical calculation.... [T]he terminology that they've 
used for me to find an exception is exceptional circumstances and exceptional cir-
cumstances, exceptional, I pulled out a dictionary to look at it, means uncommon 
[T]his is a frustration to me. I'm very troubled with [this] case, I can tell 
you." (Supp.R. 50-51.) 
At several points during the hearing, the trial court described circumstances which 
clearly supported an unequal division under the Burke test, yet the court felt constrained 
by its mistaken reading of the Court of Appeals' decision to impose an outcome that was 
in the court's opinion inequitable: 
It strikes me that there is a problem if you have an extremely wealthy family or the 
beginnings of a wealthy family and much of the wealth increased during the 
course of a 27 year marriage and you take all of that out without any opportunity 
for some kind of cross-compensation from other sources, it seemed to me, or for 
the spouse of that person, if alimony or other things are to maintain a certain level 
of lifestyle, how can one be allowed to have all the growing assets and the other 
have none of the growing assets. Now, that wasn't exactly the case but that was in 
part my thinking. (Supp. R. 13.) 
* * * * 
I mean I just felt like, I just felt like it was equitable for me to, after a 27 year mar-
riage and to recognize that all the life of Ms. Jensen's, let's say productive and as-
set growing years were essentially allocated to this marriage, that she ought to 
have a significant asset value at the end because some things that had preexisted 
the marriage, had I think, grown quite dramatically and if I recall, the sale of the -
well, I'm not now recalling exactly how the money went but there was the sale of 
2 The reference "Supp. R." is to the transcript of the March 8, 2000 hearing, which was 
not paginated with the original record on appeal but has been included as a supplement to 
the record by stipulation of the parties. 
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the mortuary business where there was quite a bit of cash that came into the mar-
riage too. But anyway, that was my feeling, was that it was equitable for her to 
have at least a certain net worth that would have been, let's say, comparable to that 
which they enjoyed during the course of their marriage. (Supp. R. 14-15.) 
* * * * 
MR. SESSIONS: I have not been able to find any direction or case law in this state 
or elsewhere that defines exceptional circumstances. 
THE COURT: To me that's a sad circumstance. Let me say it this way, in Mr. 
Christensen's memorandum and the citation and references to the other cases that 
have relied on the sound discretion of the trial court for that kind of history, that's 
all gone with Burke [sic - Burt] because there would be, I mean it's just a func-
tionary kind of approach. You don't need a judge anymore, all you need is an ac-
countant. All you need is somebody who can add up the dollars here and there 
and then just cut them right in half and give half to each and that's where I find a 
little bit of grief in my own mind because I think you know how I wrestled with 
this case in terms of trying to create a credible net worth and circumstance for Ms. 
Jensen that I felt was justified under the course of marriage and the term and dura-
tion and so on. (Supp. R. 24-25.) 
The foregoing comments of the trial court illustrate two things. First, they illus-
trate that the court clearly had in mind the sort of reasoning that justifies an unequal dis-
tribution of property under Burke. Second, they illustrate that the trial court misinter-
preted the mandate of the Court of Appeals in this case. The court felt that it was re-
quired to apply a mathematical formula that precluded the result the trial court felt was 
fair and equitable. 
Contrary to the trial court's conclusion, which was based on a misunderstanding of 
the nature of "exceptional circumstances," this case clearly satisfied the elements of 
Burke calling for an unequal division of the marital estate. The trial court instinctively 
recognized the existence of these factors, but misunderstood the legal standard to be ap-
plied to their consideration. As they apply to this case, the Burke factors are: 
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The amount and kind of property to be divided. This factor troubled the 
trial court. The separate property consisted of real estate and business operations. Much 
mixing of property had occurred, and some operations had subsidized others or had been 
subsidized from marital funds. There had been significant commingling of marital funds 
and effort in Husband's separate property, yet it was difficult to assign a current dollar 
value to the marital contribution or to separate it from the other property. The trial court 
wanted to keep the ranch properties intact, but in order to do so felt a compelling need to 
compensate Wife by awarding her a disproportionate share of the remaining property. 
Whether the property was acquired before or during the marriage. Part of 
the ranch operation, particularly Moynier and much of the equipment, was acquired dur-
ing the marriage with marital funds and other money earned during the marriage, yet had 
become an integral part of the ranching operation. 
The source of the property. Some of the separate property had been gifted 
to Husband by his father. Much of the remainder had been acquired or augmented during 
the marriage. This augmentation of property during the marriage, both by direct financial 
investment and by investment of "sweat equity" by Husband, weighed strongly in favor 
of the trial court's desire to weigh the division of the diminished marital estate in favor of 
Wife. 
The health of the parties. This factor did not weigh in favor of or against 
either party. 
The parties' standard of living, respective financial conditions, needs, and 
earning capacity. The trial court expressly noted its view that this factor weighed heavily 
in Wife's favor: 
[W]hen they're married they have the $3 million plus $200,000 a year in income 
and the lifestyle that they're able to live is not just a lifestyle that supports - let's 
call that even though it's comfortable, relatively spartan living circumstances, but 
it's one that supports the opportunity to really fund a trip to Europe or a major 
holiday every year, one for the kids and so on, things like that and maybe even 
some contributions to their future financial security . . . . (Supp. R. 43-44.) 
Husband's lifestyle was unaffected by the divorce. He had some $7 million in separate 
property, including nearly $4 million in cash and marketable securities, and earnings of 
$200,000 per year. Wife, on the other hand, ultimately received mostly illiquid assets, 
including a home, two cars, retirement assets of some $170,000, and approximately ten 
percent of the Zions Bank stock, worth under $400,000. She had no earning ability, and 
did not enjoy the benefits of the $7 million in separate property that had previously given 
the parties financial security. After a 27 year marriage and under the circumstances of 
this case, the trial court found such a result to be inequitable, but imposed it anyway be-
cause it thought the Court of Appeals' decision in this case required it to do so. 
The duration of the marriage. This was a long term marriage which began 
when the parties were young and Husband was just beginning his career. This factor 
weighs heavily in favor of an outcome that leaves the parties in relatively equal financial 
and lifestyle positions following the dissolution of the marriage. 
The children of the marriage. The parties had children but all but one were 
emancipated by the time of trial, so this factor was of little weight in this case. 
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The parties' ages at time of marriage and of divorce. The parties married 
when Husband was just beginning his career as a lawyer and Wife was making career 
choices of her own. At the time of divorce, both parties were in their fifties and focusing 
on their retirement years. Their combined assets would have been adequate to support an 
early and comfortable retirement, and Husband's assets and earning ability continued to 
be such post-divorce. Wife lacked both the assets and the earning capacity of Husband. 
What the parties gave up by the marriage. The parties made a choice early 
in the marriage that Wife would be a homemaker and Husband would be the primary 
breadwinner. Wife devoted herself to keeping the household and raising the family, 
which enabled Husband to maximize his earnings. In doing so, Wife sacrificed her own 
ability to pursue a career or to otherwise become financially independent, which inextri-
cably and permanently tied her financial future to that of Husband. See Dunn v. Dunn, 
802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990). 
The necessary relationship the property division has with the amount of 
alimony and child support to be awarded. The trial court noted that the parties' substan-
tial combined net worth gave them financial security and allowed them to maintain a life-
style that Husband's earnings alone would not have supported. The final division of the 
marital estate was initially tilted in favor of Wife in part because Husband came out of 
the marriage with the bulk of the assets that had supported that lifestyle. The trial court 
also relied completely on the division of property to justify its award of no alimony, but 
when Wife's share of the marital estate was reduced by $500,000 on remand, her ability 
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to support herself from earnings on assets in a lifestyle comparable to Husband's was re-
duced by a proportionate amount. 
The foregoing discussion amply demonstrates the existence of exceptional circum-
stances justifying the result the trial court felt was equitable in the first place, which was 
an award of two-thirds of the diminished marital estate to Wife. The trial court repeat-
edly expressed an erroneous view of the applicable legal standard. Had it applied the cor-
rect standard, it could and would have achieved the result it had found to be fair and equi-
table in the first place. In applying the incorrect standard, the trial court expressly ac-
knowledged that the result did not seem fair, but said that it believed it was simply im-
plementing the mandate of the Court of Appeals: 
I will tell you that I would have preferred this case to have been determined oth-
erwise. I'm just going to tell you and have that simply part of the record. I wres-
tled with this very hard and I thought it was right and I told you at the time that 
that was an issue that remained in the case. I can remember having that very con-
versation in the jury room with both lawyers saying that I know I haven't done this 
that way, but it just seems fair - done with all the details, but it just seems appro-
priate, fair, and equitable under the circumstances of the life of these persons. I 
don't find that there are, consistent with what I think the Court of Appeals had in 
mind as the basis for me to conclude that there were exceptional circumstances. 
(Supp. R. 58.) 
As it stands, the decision of the trial court is, in the trial court's own view, inequitable. 
Accordingly, a reversal is called for, and reinstatement of the previous property division 
is appropriate. 
B. The Trial Court Erred In Awarding Marital Property to Hus-
band as Separate Property. 
This court reversed the initial property division because the trial court had not 
adequately explained its departure from the presumption of Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1990), that the marital estate must be divided in half absent exceptional 
circumstances. Yet when the trial court decided the case after remand, it failed to include 
admittedly marital property that had for convenience been classified in the separate cate-
gory, and thus awarded more than 50 percent of the marital estate to Husband. 
Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be part of the marital estate 
in the absence of persuasive contrary evidence. "Marital property is ordinarily all prop-
erty acquired during the marriage and it encompasses all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source derived." Dunn v. 
Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In this case, Husband claimed that 
a large portion of the parties' assets were his separate property. It was thus his burden to 
prove that they were separate, and in the absence of such proof it was error for the trial 
court not to include such assets in the marital estate. 
At least $500,000 (see bullet points below) of marital funds were invested in the 
ranching operations that were awarded to Husband as separate property. At the time of 
trial, the value of that investment exceeded $2 million. In its initial property division, the 
trial court acknowledged that there were problems with separating the commingled mari-
tal property from Husband's separate property. To compensate, the court awarded more 
than 50 percent of the marital estate to Wife. When it was required on remand to be more 
specific about what it had done, the trial court instead let stand the award of marital funds 
as part of Husband's separate property, and then divided the remaining diminished mari-
tal estate in half. That was error. 
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The evidence that marital funds and property had been used to maintain and en-
hance the ranch properties was undisputed: 
• T-N Company owed Wife a $30,000 note which was converted into equity 
in T-N Company. (R. 324 at p. 51; R. 325 at pp. 87-88.) 
• T-N Company owed $78,348 to the law office, a clearly marital asset. 
(R. 324 at p. 51.) 
• Wife's one-half interest in Malpaso (the trucking company), including but 
not limited to the $85,031 promissory note that funded T-N Company 
equipment purchases, was also absorbed into T-N Company. (R. 323 at 
pp. 34-35, 174-75; R. 118.) 
• During the marriage, Husband invested at least $78,000 of his income from 
the practice of law into T-N Company. (R. 323 at p. 126; R. 324 at p. 51.) 
• When $65,000 was needed for the ranch in 1996, Husband did not sell his 
allegedly separate stock to get the money. Instead, he sold 1,837 shares 
from the admittedly marital portion of Zions Bank stock. (Plaintiffs Ex-
hibit 7; Defendant's Exhibit 20; R. 323 at pp. 81-82.) The proceeds from 
this sale were used to purchase machinery for T-N Company and to finance 
its operations. 
• The Moynier property, worth $1.8 million, was acquired with marital funds. 
The evidence established that the $25,000 down payment came from joint 
funds. Husband admitted that $147,000 of the purchase price did not come 
-28-
from separate property (R. 323 at p. 182), and the court found that the re-
maining installment payments were paid with income from the ranching 
operations earned during the marriage. In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 
P.2d 598 (Utah App. 1994), the court held that a portion of the husband's 
business property, which was initially paid for by funds the husband inher-
ited, was properly included as a marital asset. The court explained that 
"[e]ven though the husband used inherited funds to pay the down payment 
on the building, he used substantial marital funds to maintain and augment 
that asset. We find no error in the determination that the appreciated portion 
of the asset changed its character from a personal asset to a marital asset." 
875 P.2d at 602-03. 
• Moynier was leased to the ranching operation at a nominal value of less 
than two cents per acre, and thus was used to subsidize the ranching opera-
tion at the expense of income that could have been earned for the marital 
estate in the marketplace. 
By modifying the property division without accounting for the undisputed com-
mingling of marital property in T-N Company over a 27-year period, the trial court erred. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the property division because it violated the Burt 50 per-
cent rule, yet the trial court on remand failed to consider that the its initial decision to 
overlook these clear comminglings was an inseparable part of the overall determination 
of an "equitable" property division in this case. 
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C. The Trial Court Erred In Assessing 7.5 Interest on the Ad-
justment Amount. 
The trial court's ultimate property division adjustment was $345,421 to be trans-
ferred from Wife to Husband. Because Wife had the use of that property during the pe-
riod after the decree and before the adjustment, the court ordered Wife to refund it with 
$49,833 interest. Even though the refund took the form of a transfer of shares of Zions 
Bank stock that had yielded a 2.2 percent dividend, the trial court ordered Wife to pay 
interest of 7.5 percent. That figure represented the putative investment return the court 
felt Wife should be able to earn on her "working" assets. 
There was no evidentiary support for the 7.5 rate of return. Indeed, there was no 
evidence at all concerning what, if anything, Wife had actually earned on investments 
during that period. The most that could be said was that the stock had paid a 2.2 percent 
dividend. The court's use of the 7.5 percent rate of return, which was itself unsupported 
by any evidence (see Point II below), was a manifest abuse of discretion and should be 
overturned even if the property division is otherwise allowed to stand. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE AWARD OF 
ALIMONY 
The trial court also committed error in reversing the award of alimony. In its deci-
sion, the Court of Appeals held, "In this case, the trial court awarded alimony without 
considering the relevant statutory factors.... Accordingly we remand to the trial court to 
make an appropriate analysis of the relevant factors before making an alimony award de-
cision." Jensen v. Jensen, 2000 UT App 213. 
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Initially, the trial court had awarded Wife $4,000 per month in alimony. Follow-
ing remand, however, the court not only reduced Wife's "working" assets, and thus her 
putative investment income, by 50 percent, but it then declined to award any alimony at 
all. Like with the property division, the trial court complained that the Court of Appeals' 
decision mandated an outcome that the trial court felt was inequitable: 
[T]he lifestyle that they're able to attribute and we've excluded now all of the 
ranch property completely which frankly that's like ignoring a 2,000 pound ele-
phant in the living room. Honestly, when it comes to looking at the estate, be-
cause you're looking at that as a source of money for one or the other of them 
anyway, okay? So you get the $3 million. You divide that in half but when 
they're married they have the $3 million plus $200,000 a year in income and the 
lifestyle that they're able to live is not just a lifestyle that supports - let's call that 
even though it's comfortable, relatively spartan living circumstances, but it's one 
that supports the opportunity to really fund a trip to Europe or a major holiday 
every year, one for the kids and so on, things like that and maybe even some con-
tributions to their future financial security and so it's hard for me to ignore ali-
mony completely in a long term marriage when one party is required to live off the 
yields of the assets but the other party has a substantial income to live off of. 
There's where I have a bit of a problem. 
Now, with the mechanical application of the rules that are applied by the 
Court of Appeals, maybe I can't look at that but that's where I have some personal 
heartburn. (Supp. R. 43-44.) 
The Court of Appeals' decision did not mandate any result. It only required that 
the trial court supply an explanation of its decision. Its "mechanical application" of some 
unspecified rule or formula was error. The trial court was mistaken in assuming that the 
statutory factors, which emphasize need and ability to pay, are exclusive or that they 
mandate a mathematical approach to alimony. Indeed, while the statute mandates con-
sideration of the financial circumstances of the parties, it also incorporates the general 
equitable principles of case law. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7). 
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"[T]he most important function of alimony is to provide support for the wife as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent 
the wife from becoming a public charge." English v. English, 565 P.2cl 409, 411 (Utah 
1977). During the marriage, the parties had over $10 million in assets, including $4.5 
million in Zions Bank stock. Their financial future was secure, and they were free to, and 
did, spend Husband's entire earned income, and moie, to support their lifestyle. 
Husband was awarded nearly $9 million in marital and separate property. Of that 
amount, $4 million was in cash or marketable securities. In addition, he had an income 
of $200,000 per year. His financial future remained secure, and there is no question that 
Husband's post-divorce lifestyle will not be diminished in any way. 
The same, however, cannot be said of Wife. It was entirely unrealistic to expect 
that she could make a meaningful contribution through employment to her own support. 
Moreover, given the parties' lifestyle during the marriage, it was unreasonable to require 
Wife to obtain the type of employment that would be available to a 51-year old woman 
with no skills. Following the reallocation of property, and excluding the home, the assets 
which Wife was awarded included an automobile; life insurance and retirement assets of 
$175,486.77 which are not available for immediate income production; and $386,528.00 
of Zions Bank stock (further reduced by $125,000.00 for the refund of alimony discussed 
below). The stock was acquired at low tax basis and yielded a dividend of 290 per share, 
or 2.2 percent. 
Nevertheless, the trial court ignored its initial analysis of the equities and instead 
followed a strictly mathematical approach on remand. The trial court found (without ex-
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planation) that Wife's need was only $4,000 per month. Wife had submitted a detailed 
budget (Ex. 2, R. 134, p. 2) showing expenses of $9,852 including income taxes. It then 
found that she could meet that need through earnings on the assets she was awarded. In 
doing so, the court made several errors. 
First, the court failed to explain which of Wife's expenses were not reasonable. 
They were consistent with the past, and none were patently unreasonable or inconsistent 
with the parties' lifestyle during the marriage. The court also completely ignored the in-
come tax owed on wife's hypothetical investment earnings. 
Second, the court determined that Wife could earn 7.5 percent on the "working" 
assets she was awarded. There was no evidentiary basis for the 7.5 percent figure. The 
court simply assumed that figure as an average long term rate of return. Even if the fig-
ure had been supported by evidence, average rates of return do not pay bills, and basing a 
decision concerning alimony on hypothetical average future returns is improper. 
In the year the court entered its final decision in this case, the Standard & Poors 
500 index lost 11.88 percent, on top of a 9.11 percent loss the year before. The assets 
wife was awarded must be invested risk free if the trial court's hypothesis is accepted that 
she can rely solely on those assets for her entire remaining life expectancy of 34 years. In 
the past five years, such returns have been in the two to five percent range. 
To earn the returns the trial court expected, Wife would have to to take significant 
risks with her financial future that Husband was not required to take. The relative finan-
cial positions of the parties do not include just the ability to meet present expenses. They 
also include the parties' financial security and financial future. In that respect, Wife was 
left completely exposed and Husband was completely protected. 
Third, the court ignored the nature of the assets awarded to Wife. It characterized 
the following assets as "working:" 
Value 
Excess value of marital residence $200,000.00 
Zions Bank stock (net amount) 271,780.00 
Certificate of deposit 29,500.00 
1990 BMW 750 18,366.00 
John Hancock life policy 55,546.00 
IRAs 16,543.00 
Savage pension 103,387.00 
40 acre parcel 45,000.00 
Spring Glen home proceeds 84,687.00 
TOTAL $824,809.00 
In order to invest funds as the court directed, Wife would have been required to 
liquidate substantial property, including stock with very low tax basis, real estate, and ve-
hicles. Retirement funds do not generate current income for people who have not 
reached retirement age. In order to get current income, the funds would have to be liqui-
dated, triggering income tax and penalties. After payment of taxes and penalties, Wife's 
net investable proceeds would have been reduced by nearly half of the amount the trial 
court assumed she had available. 
Finally, the court attributed minimum wage income to Wife. After a 27-year mar-
riage in which Wife was not employed, and in which the parties lived in a million dollar 
home, drove the newest cars, and had no financial concerns, to expect Wife to support 
herself at a minimum wage job while Husband continues to enjoy the financial success 
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built by both parties during the previous 27 years is not only inequitable, it is uncon-
scionable. See Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075-76 (Utah 1985). 
The final decree in this case left Wife with 5,239 shares of Zions Bank stock, 
which paid an annual dividend of $1.16 per share, or $506 per month. Accepting ar-
guendo the improbable proposition that all of the other "working" assets (except the re-
tirement assets which cannot generate current income) could be invested, without any re-
duction for taxes incurred upon sale, to generate current income of four percent per year, 
Wife's additional monthly income is only $1,259 before income taxes. The conclusion 
that she could live in the pre-divorce lifestyle for that amount was an abuse of discretion 
and was without factual basis. 
The evidence in this case plainly supported the trial court's initial award of $4,000 
per month alimony, especially in light of the redistribution of assets that occurred on re-
mand. The only evidence of Wife's income was the dividends on Zions Bank stock of 
$506 per month. All of the other so-called investment income was speculative and with-
out evidentiary support, based on the unsupported guess that a 7.5 percent rate of return 
was available. In the initial findings of fact, the trial court made no finding concerning 
Wife's need. (See R. 236-37.) In the findings after remand, the court "backed into" a 
need figure of $4,000 per month, without explaining how it was calculated. (R. 621.) 
The evidence at trial supported need of $9,852. Thus, applying just the Jones or statutory 
factors, alimony of at least $4,000 was warranted. 
See footnote 1 for calculation. 
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 ($824,809 - 271,780 - 55,546 - 16,543 - 103,387) x .04 = 15,102 -s-12 = $1,259. 
The other factors set forth in English also mandate an award of substantial ali-
mony. After a 27 year marriage, Husband received some $7 million in separate and mari-
tal assets. During the marriage, he had freely made his separate property available for 
payment of family expenses, and that property had contributed significantly to the fam-
ily's lifestyle. Even without those assets, Husband's income was more than adequate to 
support the alimony award. As the trial court observed, under these circumstances it 
would have been inequitable to require Wife to place assets at risk, and perhaps liquidate 
assets, in order to support the lifestyle that the parties enjoyed during the marriage and 
which Husband continued to enjoy thereafter. The court applied its rationale evenhand-
edly, ordering that alimony should terminate when Husband reaches retirement age and 
his earned income presumably declines. 
The trial court's reluctant formulaic approach, erroneously assumed to have been 
mandated by the Court of Appeals, was legally wrong. The Court's expressed justifica-
tion for the initial award of alimony was correct, and its view that it had been instructed 
on remand to reach a different result was error. Moreover, its ultimate decision to award 
no alimony, which results in a huge discrepancy in the living standards of the parties after 
a 27-year marriage, was a manifest abuse of discretion. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING WIFE TO RETURN 
$125,000 IN ALIMONY PREVIOUSLY PAID. 
The trial court required Wife to refund to Husband $125,000 of alimony that was 
paid after January 19, 1999, when the Supplemental Decree was entered, and until July 7, 
2000 when the Court of Appeals remanded this case for further findings on both the 
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property division and alimony issues. The court held that Wife could discharge this obli-
gation by transferring additional Zions Bank stock to Husband at $56.50 per share. 
(R. 622.) 
Before the judgment was entered, there was an agreement in place pursuant to 
which Husband agreed to pay temporary alimony of $6,000 per month. When the Sup-
plemental Decree was entered on January 19, 1999, he paid alimony of $4,000 per month 
until July 7, 2000 when this case was remanded for further findings on both the property 
division and alimony issues. Husband paid no further alimony thereafter. 
In reversing the alimony award and remanding the case for further findings regard-
ing alimony, the Court of Appeals instructed the trial court to "first divide the marital es-
tate in accordance with our instructions, and then proceed to consider alimony. . . . " Jen-
sen v. Jensen, 2000 UT App 213 at n.l (unpublished decision). Under those circum-
stances, the status of the case was as it was before the lower court entered the original 
alimony order. Therefore, the temporary alimony arrangement was still in effect and 
Wife was entitled to receive the temporary alimony agreed upon by the parties of $6,000 
per month less the $2,000 per month mortgage payments paid by Husband until the ali-
mony issue was finally concluded. 
When an issue is generally reversed, "the case stands in the lower court precisely 
as it did before the trial court was had in the first instance." Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. 
Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1979). This necessarily means that the pre-judgment 
temporary alimony agreement must have been in effect. Husband cannot have it both 
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ways. Either the alimony award was effective until modified following remand, or it was 
still in dispute and the pre-judgment alimony agreement was in effect. 
The trial court's decision was inequitable. Wife was not previously on notice that 
monies paid as temporary alimony were not available for consumption. Moreover, the 
assets she had been awarded had not generated the income presumed by the trial court. 
Thus, Wife was required to pay both the refund in alimony, and the trial court's interest 
assessment on the property transfer, using the Zions Bank stock. This further imperiled 
her financial position and reduced her future ability to support herself from income on the 
so-called "working" assets she received in the divorce. 
Husband agreed before the commencement of this action that the pre-judgment 
temporary alimony amount should be $6,000 per month, including the mortgage pay-
ments. There is no reason to depart from this amount. Husband's refusal to provide any 
support, despite his knowledge of Wife's reliance on and need of support, is unjustified. 
Wife should have judgment for $6,000 per month until June 22, 2001, when the Second 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce was entered, less any credit Husband is entitled to for 
mortgage payments. Further, if the trial court's decision on alimony is reversed, as it 
should be, temporary alimony should continue until a final determination on alimony is 
made, either by this Court or the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Wife requests that this court reverse the trial court's Second Supplemental Decree 
of Divorce and, utilizing the initial evidence before the court, combined with the addi-
tional findings made by the court following remand, reinstate the property division and 
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alimony awards contained in the initial decree. Alternatively, Wife requests that this 
court remand the case to the lower court for application of the correct legal standards in 
determining property division and alimony. 
DATED this J^_ day of March, 2002. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By <f-<^IA /^ 
Harold G. Christensen 
Rodney R. Parker 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914) 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (3981) 
CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
2 01 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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J 9 1399 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA H. JENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES T. JENSEN, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 964900752 
Judge David S. Young 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for trial before 
the undersigned, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court 
commencing on October 28, 1997 and concluding with closing 
arguments on November 12, 1997. Thereafter, the Respondent moved 
the Court to bifurcate the proceedings and to immediately grant a 
Decree of Divorce to the Petitioner which the Court did by Decree 
of Divorce entered in the above-captioned action on June 22, 1998. 
The Court thereafter considered the evidence and testimony adduced, 
the arguments and statements of counsel, the files and records 
herein and the law appertaining thereto and having issued its 
Memorandum Decision on November 12, 1998, and being fully advised 
in the premises, now make and enters the following: 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the parties were married each to the 
other on July 30, 1970, a marriage of some 28 years. 
2. The Court finds that the parties were each raised in 
Carbon County, State of Utah and that the Plaintiff, following 
graduation from high school, attended two years of College of 
Eastern Utah and one year at the University of Utah. 
3. The Court finds that during the course of the parties1 
marriage, the Plaintiff engaged in limited work outside of the 
parties1 home, including some work as a secretary/receptionist and 
bookkeeper in the law offices of her husband and her father-in-law, 
Therald N. Jensen, ("TN Jensen") who was a prominent attorney in 
Price, Utah, until his death. Additionally, the Court finds that 
TN Jensen's financial interests included banking and ranching as 
well as the practice of law. 
4. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is able-bodied and 
capable of working outside of the home, but that her income from 
employment would be nominal. 
5. The Court finds that the Defendant was admitted to 
practice law in the State of Utah in 1969 and practiced primarily 
in Carbon County, State of Utah, with his father until a fairly 
recent move to Salt Lake City, Utah, where he accepted employment 
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with and is currently employed by Savage Industries as Executive 
Vice President and General Counsel with annual earnings of 
approximately $195,000, which includes bonuses from time to time. 
Further, the Court finds that the Defendant is a member of the 
board of directors of Zions First National Bank from which he 
receives director's fees and that he has other dividend and 
interest earnings from investments and other business operations as 
hereinafter more fully set forth. 
6. The Court finds that the Defendant was previously married 
and had one child born as the issue of that marriage. Further, the 
Court finds that the parties had three children born as the issue 
of their marriage, two of whom are emancipated by age and the 
youngest of whom is currently a senior in high school and will 
shortly be emancipated. 
7. The Court finds that the Defendant has substantial 
separate property which originated from his parents as well as from 
gifts and inheritances which the Court further finds were not 
commingled with marital property and that the Plaintiff did not 
augment, maintain or protect the same sufficient to lose the 
identify of such properties as separate properties. With respect 
to such separate property, the Court finds that such was acquired 
principally through the TN Jensen family and that much of the 
property involved in the Defendant's current ranching interest was 
significantly obtained and had it origins in the 1940's, 1950fs and 
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1960fs, prior to the marriage of the parties. Additionally, the 
Court find that during the period after the initial acquisition of 
such properties and prior to his death in 1992, TN Jensen acquired 
considerable ranching interests and inventory. The Court also 
finds that the testimony is undisputed that it was the primary 
dream of TN Jensen to provide ranching opportunities for his 
children and their children consistent with their individual 
desires and that such dream was well accomplished. 
8. The Court finds that T.N. Company is a Utah partnership 
formed in approximately 1982 or 1983 by TN Jensen and his children, 
James, Jerry and Butch. The Court also finds that T.N. Company is 
the successor company to T.N., Inc. In the beginning, TN Jensen 
owned 84% of the company and at the time of his death, he retained 
48.6% of the company. While the percentage ownership interests of 
the three Jensen brothers according to the official records are not 
equal, it was clear from the testimony that they each deemed their 
interest to be equal and that the Defendant claims only a one-third 
interest regardless of what the official records may show or 
reflect. 
9. The Court finds that T.N. Company is the operating 
company of the livestock operations and has encountered significant 
losses during recent years. In 1996, such losses were $340,000. 
TN Company owns in excess of 1,100 cows, 60 bulls and 30 horses 
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with miscellaneous tack, vehicles and equipment consistent 
therewith. 
10. The Court finds that T.N. Company is comprised of 
inherited property and should remain the sole and separate property 
of the Defendant including any appreciated value thereon. 
11. The Court finds that T.N. Ranches is the entity which is 
the principal owner of the Range Creek Ranch which consists of a 
coalition of multiple homesteads and was acquired by T.N. Jensen 
and his wife during the 1950s. Such properties were contributed in 
whole from TN Jensen and Mrs. Jensen to T.N., Inc. which then 
transferred the same to T.N. Ranches. 
12. The Court finds that much of the property is titled in 
the name of "Jensen Brothers" or their individual names. Such 
properties include a substantial interest in deeded real property, 
state and federal grazing permits and U.S. Forest Service permits. 
The Court finds that Jensen Brothers is owned one-third by each of 
the brothers and includes the following: 
a. The Moynier Ranch. The Court finds that the Moynier 
Ranch was purchased through an agreement dated September 1, 1976 by 
Butch Jensen and thereafter assigned to the three Jensen brothers. 
The evidence adduced at trial was that the Moynier Ranch was 
effectively obtained by Butch Jensen but assigned to the three 
Jensen brothers and paid for through the ranching operations or 
T.N. Company. The Court finds that there was no evidence of cash 
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calls from marital estate property from any of the brothers, except 
for one sum of approximately $25,000 which apparently was received 
in cash at the time of the passing of TN Jensen, the second parent 
of the Defendant to die. Each child received approximately $25,000 
at that time and while it is unclear as to whether the $25,000 is 
separate from the testimony in which it was testified that the 
Defendant put approximately $25,000 into the purchase price of the 
Moynier Ranch, arguably from marital property, the Court finds that 
it remains fair, just and equitable to allow the Defendant to 
retain the whole of the Jensen Brothers property assets and 
interests as his sole and separate property and further finds that 
as an equitable offset of the $25,000 which, if it came from 
marital funds would be subject to sharing, has been equitably dealt 
with in relation to other assets of the marital estate hereinafter 
described. 
b. The Black Dragon (Spotted Wolf) Grazing Permit: The 
Court finds said permit was obtained by Butch Jensen and a brother-
in-law, James D. Wilcox through an option to purchase. Thereafter 
the interests of Mr. Wilcox was assigned to Butch Jensen and on 
behalf of Butch the prior owners were notified in September of 1980 
of the election to exercise such option. This asset is held in the 
names of each of the Jensen brothers individually. The purchase 
price of $55,000, the Court finds was paid in annual installments 
of $11,000 each, with applicable interest and the funds for the 
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purchase were provided by TN Jensen. As such, the property and 
successor interests remain the separate property of the Defendant 
and his brothers. 
c. The Coal Creek Farm and Orfanakis Winter Grazing 
Property was acquired prior to 1970 by TN Jensen and his wife and 
consists of approximately b60 acres in Wellington, Utah. That 
property was conveyed from TN Jensen and his wife to T.N. Ranches 
in 1983 and from T.N. Ranches to the three Jensen brothers in 1989. 
Thus, the property originated from TN Jensen and his wife and 
remains the separate property of the Defendant and his brothers. 
The Court also finds that the Orfanakis Winter Grazing Property had 
an origin similar to the Coal Creek Farm through TN Jensen and his 
wife and was conveyed from them through T.N. Ranches to the three 
Jensen brothers in 1989 and remains the sole and separate property 
of the Defendant and his brothers. 
d. The Cisco Winter Grazing Permit was obtained by TN 
Jensen for a purchase price of approximately $100,000 in February 
of 1987, which purchase price was paid entirely by TN Jensen and 
placed ultimately in the name of the three Jensen brothers. As 
such, it was acquired by TN Jensen and remains the sole and 
separate property of the Defendant and his brothers. 
e. The Siaperis Lands were acquired pursuant to an 
agreement with Nick and Ileen Siaperis in 1977 whereunder a 60 acre 
field was acquired for $70,000. Approximately one month later, the 
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Siaperis1 assigned an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
they held with Alex and Shirley Tidwell to TN Jensen and the 
Defendant to purchase their property for $60,000. The combined 
purchase price amounted to $130,000. The Defendant and his mother 
borrowed $130,000 from Walker Bank to pay the combined purchase 
price and mortgaged the law office building, then held exclusively 
in the name of Mrs. Jensen as security for such loan. After the 
purchase price was paid, the land was titled in the names of the 
Defendant and his mother and later was traded for property 
adjoining the Coal Creek Farm which was titled in the name of the 
Defendant and his mother as joint tenants with rights of 
survivorship. Upon the death of Mrs. Jensen, her interest was 
conveyed to Jerry Jensen and Butch Jensen as tenants in common. 
While there appears to be an imbalance presently in the ownership 
from the one-third interest testified to by the Defendant, it does 
appear that all of the funds giving rise to the purchase of the 
property came from Mrs. Jensen through her interests in the office 
building and thus the property should remain the separate property 
of the Defendant and his brothers. 
f. The Court finds that the ranching company has BLM 
authorization in Rock Creek, Fan Canyon, Columbia, and Icelander 
grazing permit allotments. These grazing permit allotments were 
all obtained by TN Jensen and/or TN Jensen and the three Jensen 
brothers prior to 1970 and in February of 1983 were transferred to 
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the three Jensen brothers. These assets, together with a Price 
River grazing allotment acquired in 1985, similarly, by the three 
Jensen brothers, for nominal consideration, and to avoid confusion 
should remain the separate property of the Defendant and his 
brothers. 
g. The Court finds that various water rights and 
mineral rights used or associated with any of the ranching and/or 
farming operations are the separate property of the Defendant and 
where appropriate, the other Jensen children. As such, the water 
rights and mineral rights remain with the respective properties as 
awarded by the Court. 
13. The Court finds that none of the aforementioned T.N. 
Ranches or Jensen Brothers Properties have ever been titled in the 
names of spouses of any of TN Jensen's children nor have any of the 
spouses ever been requested to pledge independent credit or support 
for the ranching operations. As such, the Court finds that it is 
fair, just and equitable that such properties be found to be 
separate properties from the marital estate, including any 
appreciated value therein. 
14. The Court finds that the testimony at trial was that the 
Plaintiff went very infrequently to the properties and there was no 
evidence that she augmented, maintained or protected the 
properties. Further, the Court finds that while there was evidence 
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that the Defendant took weekend time away from the family to work 
on the properties, and that in the property subsequently referred 
to as "commingled" Plaintiff will receive, the Court finds that she 
will receive through the distribution of assets herein, an 
equitable allocation to enhance her share of the marital estate. 
15. The Court finds that the Defendant throughout the 
marriage maintained an active practice of law and thus through that 
practice generated income to support the Plaintiff and their family 
and that while the ranching operations represent a significant 
present value, they have not been a major source of funding for 
ongoing family activities and operations. Additionally, the Court 
finds that the Defendant's allocation of time to the ranching 
properties has been primarily spare time away from th€* practice of 
law, but certainly likewise, away from the family, and thus at the 
expense of family sacrifices. 
16. That during the marriage of the parties, a residence and 
real property known as the Monica Cove home, which is now the 
residence of the Plaintiff and two of the parties1 children, one of 
whom is emancipated by age and employment and the other of whom is 
a senior in high school was acquired. The Court further finds that 
the funds used to acquire the Monica Cove residence and real 
property were obtained from an investment of the Defendant prior to 
the marriage of the parties in approximately April of 1968. At 
that time, he joined with two other individuals in forming the 
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Mitchell Funeral Home, Inc., a Utah corporation. Thereafter, in 
May of 1990, Walmart stores purchased the property of the funeral 
operations for development of a store in Price, Utah. To 
accomplish the transaction, Walmart purchased a lot on Chula Vista 
Circle in Sale Lake City, Utah, which was traded for the price of 
the property generating a tax free exchange. The purchase included 
a home and the purchase price was $310,000. The home was later 
sold for approximately $391,000. Further, the Court finds that a 
separate payment of $100,000 was made to the Defendant by the 
succeeding owners of the funeral home in order to purchase his 
entire interest in the ongoing business operations. Those two 
amounts combined, equal $491,000, which amount was put into the 
purchase of the lot and home at Monica Cove. Additionally, the 
evidence was that the parties had built a home on property owned by 
the Plaintiff's father in Carbon County, Utah and it is to those 
marital homes that the Plaintiff has devoted 28 years of marriage 
and as to the Monica Cove residence and real property that the 
Court finds that the Plaintiff has augmented, maintained and 
protected the same in such a way so as to provide value to the 
asset and the family's living circumstances. The Court finds in 
addition, that no effort was made to loan the $491,000 contribution 
to the marriage and the Defendant did not intend to retain that 
asset as his sole and separate property. As such, the Court finds 
that all assets associated with obtaining the Monica Cove residence 
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and real property, whether they came from the Carbon County home, 
the contribution personally of the parties to the marriage or the 
value from the Mitchell Funeral Home, have been sufficiently 
commingled so as to negate a finding that the Monica Cove residence 
and real property is the sole and separate property of the 
Defendant. 
17. The Court finds that in August of 1973, 3 years after the 
parties were married, Zions Bank purchased the Carbon Emery Bank in 
a stock exchange. At that time, the Defendant received 2,616 
shares of Zions Bank stock listed in his sole and separate name 
which represented his interest in the Carbon Emery Bank prior to 
the parties' marriage. The testimony was clear that the Defendant 
did not at any time believe that the Zions Bank stock was anything 
other than separate property pre-dating the marriage. Through 
subsequent stock splits and an additional unknown augmentation of 
748 shares, such stock over time increased the Defendant's portion 
to 8,042 shares of stock. Those beginning shares with stock splits 
and automatic dividend reinvestment purchases have expanded that 
portion of the stock to 58,352 shares. 
18. The Court finds that in June of 1985, the Defendant 
placed all of the stock in joint tenancy with rights of 
survivorship with the Plaintiff. This change was made according to 
the testimony of the parties at a time when the Defendant was 
engaged in significant business travel, and the change was made to 
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avoid probate in the event of his untimely death. There was no 
evidence adduced at the trial of any donative intent with respect 
to such exchange. 
19. The Court finds that during the course of the parties' 
marriage, additional shares in Zions Bank were acquired in a total 
amount after stock splits and dividend reinvestment purchases to an 
existing total of 30,141 shares of such stock, which the Court 
finds to be marital property and equally divided between the 
parties. Since the trial, Zions Bank has paid and the Defendant 
has received dividends totaling .50 per share on the 30,141 shares 
determined to be marital property. The Court further finds that 
the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff as her share of such 
dividends, the sum of $7,535.25 less income taxes attributable 
thereto which the Defendant shall pay in the approximate amount of 
$3,014, resulting in a net sum payable to the Plaintiff from the 
Defendant of $4,521.25. 
20. The Court finds that in early 1974, TN Jensen and his 
wife agreed to gift to the Defendant and Jerry Jensen, 
approximately 4.2 acres of land northwest of Price, Utah. The two 
Jensen brothers constructed on that property a 50' x 60' shop 
building, at an approximate cost of $25,000. At approximately that 
same time, Jerry Jensen conveyed an interest in American Transport, 
Inc. to the Defendant who changed the name of that corporation to 
Malpaso Corporation which the Court finds is effectively defunct, 
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owning only two trucks with a combined value of approximately 
$7,000. The Court finds that it is fair, just and equitable that 
Malpaso Corporation be awarded to the Defendant as his sole and 
separate property, 
21. The Court finds that the shop constructed on the land 
hereinabove described was used by T.N., Inc. and T.N. Company and 
Malpaso Corporation when viable and those companies provided the 
funds from which the repayment of the bank loan was made. In 
January, 1980, the Plaintiff and the Defendant, the joint tenants 
in ownership of the shop, conveyed the same to TN Jensen who in 
return conveyed the office building to the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant. The office building described herein is the same 
building through which both TN Jensen and the Defendant practiced 
law. No monetary consideration was exchanged and the office 
building was of significantly greater value than the shop. The 
shop was thereafter conveyed to T.N. Company and remains an asset 
of T.N. Company at this time. 
22. The Court finds that the office building was sold to the 
Sampinos family for a net after costs and commission, of 
$172,731.67, which sum is presently held in escrow at Summit 
Exchange Services, Inc. The Court further finds that the value 
from the office building, the use of the office building during the 
term of the marriage and the apparent variations in value of the 
exchange of the office building for the shop, justifies the finding 
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that the office building asset was intended by the Defendant and TN 
Jensen to be a marital asset and was sufficiently commingled so as 
to have lost its separate identity. As a marital asset, the Court 
finds it is subject to equal division between the parties. 
23. The Court finds that the parties separately and during 
the course of their marriage, have acquired certain oil, gas and 
mineral royalties and that since the trial, certain amounts have 
been received by the Defendant therefrom. With respect to such 
oil, gas and mineral interests, the Court finds that they should be 
awarded to the party in whose name they are titled and that such 
interests which are titled jointly should be equally divided 
between the parties. Additionally, the Court finds that the 
Defendant should pay to the Plaintiff from royalties he has 
received since the trial, a net sum of $788.95 representing gross 
receipts of $1,314.95 less estimated tax which the Court finds the 
Defendant should pay of $526.00. 
24. The Court finds that the furniture, furnishings and 
personal property at the Monica Cove home have an approximate value 
of $75,000 and should be awarded to the Plaintiff as her sole and 
separate property, together with all clothing, jewelry and personal 
effects, without consideration as to value. 
25. The Court finds that all clothing, jewelry and personal 
effects of the Defendant should be awarded to him as his sole and 
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separate property without consideration of value, together with a 
mantle piece from the Spring Glen home with a value of $10,000. 
26. The Court finds that the TN Jensen Home Place and Big 
Field shall remain the separate property of the Jensen children, 
namely the Defendant, Jerry Jensen, Bonnie Jensen and Butch Jensen, 
without claim from the Plaintiff and that she has waived any claim 
thereto in open court. 
27. The Court finds that the 40 acre parcel of raw ground 
which abuts the Coal Creek Farm should be awarded to the Plaintiff 
as her sole and separate property at a value of $45,000, subject to 
existing roadways, ditches and easements. 
28. The Court finds that the parties have acquired various 
vehicles and that the Plaintiff should be awarded the 1990 BMW 
vehicle with an equity of $18,675 and the 1995 Jeep Cherokee 
automobile with an equitable value of $23,925. The Court further 
finds that the 1993 Chevrolet truck is an asset of T.N. Company and 
has otherwise been considered herein and that the Defemdant should 
be awarded as his sole and separate property, the 19 95 Chevrolet 
Tahoe with an equitable value of $22,575 and the 1985 Coachman 
motor home with an equitable value of $12,436. 
29. The Court finds that certain certificates of deposit at 
Zions Bank in the amount of $28,982.49 plus subsequent increases 
should be equally divided between the parties. 
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30. The Court finds that the parties' 1996 federal tax 
refunds of $21,543 shall be divided equally between the parties. 
31. The Court finds that an existing John Hancock life 
insurance policy with a cash value of $55,546 should be awarded to 
the Plaintiff as her sole and separate property and further finds 
that each of the parties should be awarded their individual 
retirement accounts in the amount of $16,542.63 each. 
32. The Court finds that since the parties' marriage and 
continuing to the date of the trial in this matter, the Defendant 
has vested benefits in the Savage Pension Fund of $206,774.27 which 
should be divided equally to each according to the Woodward formula 
and that a Qualified Domestic Relations Order should be entered 
with respect thereto. 
33. The Court finds that the equity resulting from the sale 
of the Spring Glen home of $169,374.72 has been divided equally 
between the parties, provided however, charges incurred for the 
chip seal of the roadway on the Plaintiff's father's land which 
provided access to the Spring Glen home and Plaintiff's father's 
home and adjoining property of her father, in the amount of 
$11,000, the court finds is a martial obligation and should be 
shared and paid equally by the parties. 
34. The Court finds that it is fair, just and equitable that 
each of the parties be responsible for any and all acquired 
obligations after their separation. 
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35. The Court finds that it is fair, just and equitable for 
the Defendant to hold the Plaintiff harmless from the first 
mortgage obligation on the Monica Cove residence and real property 
to Far West Bank and the line of credit to Zions Bank in the 
combined amount of $203,000, thereby allowing the Plaintiff to 
continue residing in such home without a mortgage obligation for as 
long as she wishes. 
36. The Court finds pursuant to its general equitable powers 
that certain assets should not be divided equally between the 
parties even though they were acquired during the course of the 
marriage and have been determined by the Court to constitute in 
part, the martial estate. By awarding the Plaintiff the greater 
portion of the marital assets, a total of $2,004,736.16 as compared 
to the marital assets awarded to the Defendant of $1,001,800.48, 
the Court recognizes that in so doing the Defendant has had the 
benefit of premarital assets that are now of significant value. 
The Court also finds that certain of the excess assets are working 
assets which the Court finds to be $1,134,811.16 which are capable 
of generating a rate of return and income to the Plaintiff for her 
support and maintenance. Assuming that rate of return to average 
7.5% per annum, which the Court finds is reasonable that amount 
should yield an income of $85,110.84 or $7,092.57 per month to the 
Plaintiff. Additionally, should the Plaintiff desire to sell the 
Monica Cove residence and move to a home of comparable value to 
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that occupied by the Defendant, the Plaintiff could generate an 
additional $200,000 which could earn an additional $15,000 per year 
or $1,250 per month. 
37. The Court could find that the income potentially 
generated from the assets awarded to the Plaintiff would be 
sufficient to meet her needs. The Court finds however, that such 
findings ignore the 27 year term of the parties1 marriage and 
equity requires that the Plaintiff should not be required to live 
off of the yield from her assets when the Defendant would not be 
required to do so by reason of his separate earned income. The 
Court finds that the Defendant's annual gross income is 
approximately $195,000, which provides a monthly gross income of 
$16,250 per month. The Defendant has been paying approximately 
$6,000 per month in temporary alimony during the parties1 
separation on a voluntary basis but the Plaintiff has been paying 
the mortgage on the Monica Cove residence in the approximate amount 
of $2,200. The Court therefore finds that the Defendant has the 
ability to pay and it is fair, just and equitable that the 
Defendant hold the Plaintiff harmless from that mortgage and that 
he should be required to pay to the Plaintiff alimony in the amount 
of $4,000 per month from November 1, 1997 until he reaches the age 
of 65 years. After age 65 years, each party should be required to 
bear their future expenses based upon their earnings generated from 
their separate assets. The Court finds that the present value of 
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the alimony award based on the assumption of a ten year term and 
assuming a return on the fund of 7,5% is $3 36,987.97. Should the 
Defendant elect, from his awarded property, he may pay at any time, 
the present value of the remaining alimony payable at a discount 
rate of 7.5% and terminate his alimony obligation. Otherwise, the 
alimony shall continue uninterrupted until the earlier of the death 
of the Defendant or his attainment of age 65. No other event 
should terminate the alimony. The Court finds in addition, that 
the Defendant should be given credit against his alimony obligation 
of the sum of $2,500 which he paid subsequent to the trial. 
38. Based upon the foregoing Supplemental Findings of Fact, 
the Court now concludes as follows: 
SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. To the extent the foregoing Supplemental Findings of Fact 
are Supplemental Conclusions of Law, the same are adopted herein in 
all respects. 
2. That each of the parties should be required to execute 
and deliver to the other, such deeds, assignments, conveyances and 
bills of sale as each may request from time to time with respect to 
the assets awarded to the respective parties including those assets 
which the Court has found and determined to be separate properties 
from the marital estate. 
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3. That each of the parties should assume, pay, discharge 
and hold the other harmless from any and all acquired obligations 
after the separation of the parties. 
4. That each of the parties should assume, pay, discharge 
and hold the other harmless from their separate costs and attorneys 
fees incurred herein. 
5. That the Court should make and enter its Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce accordingly. 
DATED this of January, 1999. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA H. JENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JAMES T. JENSEN, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 964900752 
Judge David S. Young 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for trial before 
the undersigned, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court 
commencing on October 28, 1997 and concluding with closing 
arguments on November 12, 1997. Thereafter, the Respondent moved 
the Court to bifurcate the proceedings and to immediately grant a 
Decree of Divorce to the Petitioner which the Court did by Decree 
of Divorce entered in the above-captioned action on June 22, 1998. 
The Court thereafter considered the evidence and testimony adduced, 
the arguments and statements of counsel, the files and records 
herein and the law appertaining thereto and having issued its 
Memorandum Decision on November 12, 1998, and being fully advised 
in the premises, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded and the 
Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay to the Plaintiff as 
and for alimony, the sum of $4,000 per month commencing November 1, 
1997 and continuing until the attainment by the Defendant of the 
age of 65 years, or his earlier death. Otherwise, the Court orders 
that the alimony awarded hereby shall continue uninterrupted and 
shall not terminate. 
2. That the Defendant shall be given credit against his 
alimony obligation, in the sum of $2,500 which he paid subsequent 
to the trial of the case. 
3. That the Defendant shall have the right at any time to 
pay the present value of the remaining alimony due the Plaintiff at 
a discount rate of 7.5% per annum and should he do so, all 
remaining alimony obligations from the Defendant to the Plaintiff 
shall be terminated. 
4. That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her 
sole and separate property, without claim from the Defendant, the 
following: 
a. The Monica Cove residence and real property at a 
value of $771,000; 
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b. Furniture, furnishings and personal property located 
at the Monica Cove residence and real property at a value of 
$75,000; 
c. 15,070.50 shares of Zions Bank stock at an 
approximate value of $781,782.19; 
d. 1990 BMW 750 automobile at a value of $18,365.84; 
e. 1995 Jeep Cherokee automobile at a value of $23,925; 
f. Zions Bank Certificate of Deposit at a value of 
$29,500; 
g. Life insurance cash value - John Hancock Life 
Insurance Company in the approximate amount of $55,546; 
h. Plaintiff's individual retirement account in the 
approximate sum of $16,542.63; 
i. One-half of Defendant's retirement plan at Savage 
Industries in the sum of $103,387.14, to be divided pursuant 
to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order; 
j. One-half of the proceeds from the sale of a 
residence and real property located in Carbon County and known 
as the Spring Glen home in the sum of $84,687.36; 
k. 4 0 acre parcel of raw ground which abuts the Coal 
Creek Farm at a value of $45,000, subject to existing 
roadways, ditches and easements. 
1. All of Plaintiff's clothing, jewelry and personal 
effects; 
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m. Any oil, gas and mineral royalties and interests 
titled solely in the name of the Plaintiff and one-half of any 
such interests titled in the joint names of the Plaintiff and 
the Defendant; 
n. The sum of $1,314.95 representing Plaintiff's share 
of oil and gas royalties received by Defendant since the 
trial, less income taxes attributable thereto in the estimated 
amount of $52 6.00, for a net sum of $788.95; 
o. The sum of $7,535.25, representing Plaintiff's share 
of dividends received by the Defendant since the trial on the 
parties' joint marital Zions Bank stock less income taxes 
attributable thereto in the estimated amount of $3,014.00 for 
a net sum of $4,521.25; 
5. The Defendant shall be awarded as his sole and separate 
property, without claim from the Plaintiff, the following: 
a. TN Company, a Utah partnership which is the 
successor to T.N., Inc., which interest equals one-third 
thereof; 
b. T.N. Ranches, which is the principal owner of the 
Range Creek Ranch which consists of a coalition of multiple 
homesteads; 
c. Jensen Brothers Properties, which includes 
substantial interests in deeded real property, state and 
federal grazing permits, and U.S. Forest Service permits, 
4 
A A {\ O A O 
including the Moynier Ranch, and the Black Dragon (Spotted 
Wolf) Grazing Permit; 
d. The Coal Creek Farm and Orphanakis Winter Grazing 
Property; 
e. The Cisco Winter Grazing Permit; 
f. The Siaperis lands and BLM authorizations in Rock 
Creek, Fan Canyon, Columbia, Icelander and Price River grazing 
permit allotments, water rights and mineral rights used or 
associated with any of the ranching and/or farming operations; 
h. 58,352 shares of Zions Bank stock as Defendant's 
pre-marital property. 
i. 15,070.50 shares of Zions Bank stock at an 
approximate value of $781,782.19; 
j. The sales proceeds of the Jensen Law Office building 
or $172,731.67, together with interest thereon since May 1997 
in the sum of $6,477, less income taxes attributable thereto 
in the estimated sum of $25,883.00; 
k. 1995 Chevrolet Tahoe at a value of $22,575; 
1. 1984 Coachman motor home at a value of $12,436; 
m. The parties1 1996 income tax refund of $21,543.00; 
n. Defendant's individual retirement account in the 
approximate sum of $16,542.63; 
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o. One-half of Defendant's retirement plan at Savage 
Industries in the sum of $103,387.14, to be divided pursuant 
to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order; 
p. The mantle piece from the Spring Glen home at a 
value of $10,000; 
q. One-half of the proceeds from the sale of a 
residence and real property located in Carbon County and known 
as the Spring Glen home in the sum of $84,687.36; 
r. All of Respondent's clothing, jewelry and personal 
effects; 
s. The TN Jensen Home Place and Big Field. 
6. That the Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to assume, 
pay, discharge and hold the Plaintiff harmless from the parties' 
first mortgage obligation on the Monica Cove residence and real 
property in favor of Far West Bank and the line of credit to Zions 
Bank in the combined amount of $203,000, together with the income 
tax obligations hereinabove set forth; 
7. Charges incurred in the amount of $11,000 for the chip 
seal of the roadway providing access to the Spring Glen home is a 
marital obligation and the same is ordered to be shared and paid 
equally by the parties. That other than as set forth herein, each 
of the parties be and they are hereby ordered to assume, pay, 
discharge and hold the other party harmless from obligations 
incurred since their separation. 
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8. That each of the parties be and they are hereby ordered 
to assume, pay and discharge their own costs and expenses incurred 
in connection herewith, including costs and attorneys fees, without 
contribution from the other. 
9. That the Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the right 
to continue as an insured under the Defendants health and medical 
insurance policy in effect through his employer, provided however, 
she shall be responsible for any premium charges associated 
therewith. 
10. That each of the parties be and they are hereby ordered 
to execute and deliver to the other such deeds, assignments, 
conveyances and bills of sale as each may request from time to time 
with respect to the assets awarded to the respective parties, 
including those assets which the Court has found and determined to 
be separate properties from the marital estate. 
DATED this If day of January, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID S. 
District 
APPROVEipAS TO FORM 
this A () day of January, 1999, 
QM^^^C^*^—— 
HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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BENCH, Judge: 
Mrs. Jensen (Wife) appeals the trial court's award of the 
Zions Bank stock and the ranch properties to Mr. Jensen 
(Husband), arguing that the trial court improperly determined 
that these were Husband's separate property. Husband cross-
appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when 
it awarded Wife a two-thirds share of the marital estate, rather 
than the presumptive equal distribution, and when it awarded 
alimony to Wife. We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in 
part. 
I. Wife's Appeal 
Wife first argues that the Zions Bank stock, which Husband 
conveyed into joint tenancy in 1985, should have been considered 
marital property. "A transfer of otherwise separate property to 
a joint tenancy with the grantor's spouse is generally presumed 
to be a gift, . . . and, when coupled with an evident intent to 
do so, effectively changes the nature of that property to marital 
property." . Bradford v. Bradford. 1999 UT App 373,f22, 993 P.2d 
887 (internal citations omitted/ emphasis added); see Greener v 
Gre*n?r. H 6 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194, 199 (1949) (requiring 
evidence of donative intent before presumption attaches). Wife 
correctly asserts that the presumption of present joint 
ownership, once attached, can only be overcome by clear and 
convincing evidence. See Neill v. Rovcg. 101 Utah 181, 120 P.2d 
327, 331 (1941). We do not agree with Wife, however, that the 
evidence adduced at trial cannot be viewed as clear and 
convincing. 
The trial court found that, "according to the testimony of 
the parties," the transfer to joint tenancy "was made to avoid 
probate in the event of [Husband's] untimely death,• and that 
" [tlhere was no evidence adduced at the trial of any donative 
intent." In reviewing the trial court's factual determinations, 
we "uphold the [trial] court's findings unless we find them to be 
'clearly erroneous,f notwithstanding the 'clear and convincing1 
standard of proof below," In re R.R.D.. 791 P.2d 206, 208 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990) (citation omitted). 
We think that the evidence and the 
conclusions which could reasonably have been 
made therefrom were such to permit the mind 
of the trial judge to attain as a reasonable 
man to the state of being clearly convinced 
of the intent of the parties not to pass a 
present interest in the [Zions shares]. 
. . . Therefore, we think that the lower 
court must be upheld in his holding that the 
presumptions arising from the agreement joint 
in form . . . have been overcome by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Greener. 212 P.2d at 206. In sum, we cannot say that the trial 
court clearly erred in determining that the intention of the 
parties in creating the joint tenancy was to protect Wife in the 
event of Husband's untimely death rather than a donative 
intention to create a present interest in Wife. 
Wife next challenges the trial court's award of the ranch 
properties to Husband, arguing that the ranch properties should 
have been included in the marital estate because they were 
"commingled with marital assets and enhanced by the parties' 
joint efforts." The trial court determined that the ranch 
properties,, which Husband largely received by gift or inheritance 
from his parents, were his separate property. In light of the 
record evidence before us, we cannot say that the trial court 
clearly erred in determining that there was no commingling of 
marital assets with the ranch properties and that Wife "went very 
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infrequently to the [ranch] properties and there was no evidence 
that she augmented, maintained[,] or protected the properties." 
II. Husbandfs Cross-Appeal 
Husband1s first argument in his cross-appeal is that the 
trial court abused its discretion in awarding a two-thirds share 
of the marital estate to Wife. In Utah, a specific procedure 
exists for property division and alimony awards: 
[T]he court should first properly categorize 
the parties1 property as part of the marital 
estate or as the separate property of one or 
the other. Each party is presumed to be 
entitled to all of his or her separate 
property and fifty percent of the marital 
property. But rather than simply enter such 
a decree, the court should then consider the 
existence of exceptional circumstances and, 
if any be shown, proceed to effect an 
equitable distribution in light of those 
circumstances and in conformity with our 
decision. That having been done, the final 
step is to consider whether, following 
appropriate division of the property, one 
party or the other is entitled to alimony. 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Despite this equal distribution presumption, the trial court 
divided the marital estate unequally, determining that "pursuant 
to its general equitable powers . . . certain assets should not 
be divided equally between the parties even though they [are 
marital property]." The procedure set forth in Burt requires the 
trial court, to first determine which property is separate--
removing it from further consideration--and then divide the 
remaining marital estate equally, unless exceptional 
circumstances are found. See id. 
In the instant case, ,f[t]he trial court made no findings as 
to any exceptional circumstances which took this case out of the 
presumptive rule of Burt." Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1023 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). Hence, we remand to the trial court to 
either divide the marital estate equally or provide sufficient 
findings as to the "exceptional circumstances" justifying 
departure from the presumptive equal distribution of the marital 
estate. The trial court's findings on remand must be 
"'sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on [this] 
factual issue was reached.1" Id. at 1021 (citation omitted). 
Husband's final argument is that the trial court abused its 
discretion in awarding alimony. Trial courts are afforded "broad 
discretion in making alimony awards." Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 
942, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1999) . However, we accord deference to the trial court only when 
it "exercised its discretion within the appropriate legal 
standards and 'supported its decision with adequate findings and 
conclusions.'" Id. (citations omitted). In this case, the trial 
court awarded alimony without considering the relevant statutory 
factors. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a) (Supp. 1999). 
Instead, the trial court based its decision on a determination 
that "[Wife] should not be required to live off the yield from 
her assets when [Husband] would not be required to do so by 
reason of his separate earned income." Accordingly, we remand to 
the trial court to make an appropriate analysis of the relevant 
factors before making an alimony award determination.1 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial courtf s award of the Zions Bank stock 
and the ranch properties to Husband. We reverse the trial 
court's division of the marital estate and its award of alimony, 
and remand for consideration of these two awards under the proper 
legal standards and procedures. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. Under the hierarchy set forth in Burt, the trial court must 
first divide the marital estate in accordance with our 
instructions on remand, and then proceed to consider alimony in 
light of the properly determined property award. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA H. JENSEN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
JAMES T. JENSEN, 
Respondent. 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 964900752 
Judge David S. Young 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for hearing 
following a remand from the Utah Court of Appeals on March 8, 2 001 
and pursuant to Petitioner's objections on file herein on June 8, 
2001. The Petitioner was present in person and represented by-
Harold G. Christensen of Snow Christensen & Martineau, her 
attorneys. The Respondent was present in person and represented by 
Clark W. Sessions of Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson, his attorneys. 
The Court reviewed the decision by the Utah Court of Appeals and 
the direction on remand and after having considered the arguments 
and statements of counsel, applicable law, Petitioner's memorandum 
and various illustrative exhibits, and Petitioner's objections and 
being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters its 
Second Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
remand as follows: 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that while neither party has cited to the 
Court precedent defining the terms "exceptional circumstances" in 
the context of justification for an unequal division of the marital 
estate, clearly those terms include deviation from the norm, higher 
than average, atypical, uncommon, extraordinary, or similar 
meanings and concepts. The Court further finds that while the 
Petitioner has detailed in her Memorandum various circumstances she 
deems to be exceptional, they do not singly or in combination 
justify the division of the marital estate between the parties on 
other than an equal basis. As such, no exceptional circumstances 
exist which would justify the division of the marital estate 
between the parties on other than an equal basis. 
2. The Court finds that it is fair, just and equitable that 
the Respondent be awarded an additional $501,468.. 00, thereby 
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equalizing the distribution of the marital estate based upon non-
contested values in the sum of $1,503,268.00 each. 
3. The Court finds that pursuant to a prior order of the 
Court, the Respondent was to have paid outstanding mortgage loans 
to Far West Bank and Zions Bank in the total sum of $203,993.51. 
The Court finds in addition that the Monica Cove residence, which 
secured said loans, was previously sold by the Petitioner and from 
the net sales proceeds was deducted the then balance owing to Far 
West Bank in the sum of $142,029.00 and Zions bank in the sum of 
$40,506.00, or a total of $182,535.00. The Court further finds 
that those sums should be deducted from the amount to be paid by 
the Petitioner to the Respondent to accomplish an equal 
distribution of the marital estate. Further, the Court finds that 
the Respondent has paid to the Petitioner following the sale of the 
Monica Cove residence, the sum of $21,388.00 of Far West Bank loan 
payments and $5,100.00 of Zions Bank loan payments. The Court also 
finds that by reason of the prior unequal distribution of the 
marital estate, the Petitioner had the use of $318,933.00 of 
property and assets properly awarded to the Respondent and that the 
Respondent should be awarded the sum of $49,833.00 (applying a 7.5% 
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rate of return per annum) for the 2 5 month period of time said 
funds were in the possession of the Petitioner. 
4. The Court finds that after the application of the 
foregoing debits, credits and adjustments, that the Respondent 
should be awarded $395,254.00 from the Petitioner and that it is 
fair, just and equitable that the Petitioner transfer to the 
Respondent on or before June 18, 2001, 7,619.3542 shares of Zions' 
Bank stock at an undisputed value of $51,875 per share as of 
January 19, 1999 together with any dividend received by the 
Petitioner on said stock since March 8, 2001. If she fails so to 
do, the Court finds that the Clerk of the Court should be 
authorized to effect such transfer. 
5. The Court finds that after having reviewed and considered 
the factors and directions from the Utah Court of Appeals in this 
case and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (7) (a) (i) - (iv) (1998) and the 
additional factors included in the revision of such statute in 
1999, that: 
a. The financial condition of the Petitioner with an 
award to her of over $1,500,000.00 and the earnings on 
$939,557.00 at .075 percent per annum, which represents the 
amount of assets awarded to her in the Memorandum Decision 
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plus the proceeds received from the sale of the Monica Cove 
residence and less $395,254.00 awarded to Respondent, will 
produce income to her of $5,872.00 per month. Further, the 
Court finds that earnings at the federal minimum wage standard 
should she desire to accept employment which the Court finds 
she will not be required to do will produce to the Petitioner 
$893.00 per month or a total income of $6,765.00 per month. 
The Court also finds that the Petitioner's living expenses and 
financial needs and requirements after the deletion of 
voluntary contributions, the outstanding mortgages on the 
Monica Cove residence previously sold and related property 
taxes thereon approximate $4,000.00 per month. As such, the 
Court finds that the Petitioner has not demonstrated a need 
for alimony from the Respondent. 
b. The financial ability of the Respondent who is 
employed on a full-time basis to provide support should the 
need of the Petitioner exist has not been disputed. 
c. The length of the parties' marriage of approximately 
27 years, the Court finds to be of long duration, but is not 
a factor that would require the payment of alimony. 
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d. At the time of the entry of the Supplemental Decree 
of Divorce herein, there was one minor child of the parties 
residing with the Petitioner, but said child has now reached 
the age of majority and is emancipated. 
e. While the Petitioner worked for a brief period of 
time during the parties' marriage at the law offices of the 
Respondent, her employment was of short duration and she was 
compensated and paid for her work. 
6. The Court finds that following consideration of the 
factors mandated by the Utah Court of Appeals and by law, that no 
alimony or other support or maintenance should be awarded to either 
of the parties hereto and further that each of them are fully 
capable of providing for their own support and maintenance without 
financial contribution from the other. 
7. The Court finds that pursuant to prior orders of this 
Court, the Respondent has paid to the Petitioner as and for alimony 
the total sum of $12 5,000.00 for which he should be awarded 
judgment against the Petitioner based upon the foregoing. Should 
the Petitioner determine to satisfy said judgment by transferring 
to the Respondent additional shares of Zions Bank stock, the value 
thereof shall be determined as of June 8, 2001 and the Petitioner 
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shall be entitled to retain any dividends paid thereon since March 
8, 2001. 
8. Based on the foregoing Second Supplemental Findings of 
Fact, the Court now concludes as follows: 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the Petitioner should be ordered to deliver to the 
Respondent on or before June 18, 2001, 7,619.3542 shares of Zions' 
Bank stock at $51,875 per share in order to equalize the 
distribution between the parties of the marital estate herein 
together with any dividends received by the Petitioner since March 
8, 2001. Should she fail to do so, the Clerk of the Court should 
be authorized to effect such transfer. 
2. That neither of the parties should be awarded alimony or 
other marital support or maintenance from the other. 
3. That the Respondent should be awarded a judgment against 
the Petitioner for the sum of $125,000.00, together with interest 
thereon from the date of entry hereof and further that should the 
Petitioner determine to satisfy said judgment by the transfer of 
additional shares of Zions Bank stock to the Respondent, the value 
thereof shall be determined as of June 8, 2001. Additionally, the 
Petitioner shall retain any dividends received on such stock prior 
to such transfer. 
4. That all other terms, provisions, conditions, and 
limitations of the Decree of Divorce and Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce previously entered herein should remain in full force and 
effect to the extent the same are not in conflict herewith. 
5. That the Court should make and enter its Second 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce accordingly 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LINDA H. JENSEN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
JAMES T. JENSEN, 
Respondent. 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 964900752 
Judge David S. Young 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett 
2-2 - 1 . % ^ 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for hearing 
following a remand from the Utah Court of Appeals on March 8, 2 001 
and pursuant to Petitioner's objections on file herein on June 8, 
2001. The Petitioner was present in person and represented by 
Harold G. Christensen of Snow Christensen & Martineau, her 
attorneys. The Respondent was present in person and represented by 
Clark W. Sessions of Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson, his attorneys. 
The Court reviewed the decision by the Utah Court of Appeals and 
the direction on remand and after having considered the arguments 
Second Supplemental Decree of I (22 
and statements of counsel, applicable law, Petitioner's memorandum 
and various illustrative exhibits, and Petitioner's objections and 
being fully advised in the premises, and having entered Second 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. That the marital estate as valued by the Court in its 
earlier Memorandum Decision and Supplemental Decree of Divorce 
entered herein shall be divided equally between the parties. 
2. That in order to accomplish an equal division and 
allocation of the marital estate as of January 19, 1999, the 
Respondent be and he is hereby awarded 7,619.3542 shares of Zions' 
Bank stock at the price of $51,875 per share and the Petitioner be 
and she is hereby ordered to effectuate such transfer to the 
Respondent on or before June 18, 2001, together with any dividends 
received by the Petitioner on said stock since March 8, 2001. If 
she fails so to do, the Clerk of the Court is hereby authorized and 
directed to effect such transfer. 
3. That no alimony or other support or maintenance should be 
awarded to either of the parties hereto and the Respondent be and 
he is hereby awarded a judgment against the Petitioner for the sum 
of $125,000.00 together with interest thereon at the judgment rate 
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until paid. Should the Petitioner determine to satisfy said 
judgment by the transfer of additional Zions Bank stock to the 
Respondent, the value thereof shall be determined as of June 8, 
2001, and the Petitioner shall be entitled to retain any dividend 
paid thereon since March 8, 2001. 
4. That all other terms, provisions, conditions and 
limitations in the Decree of Divorce and Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce previously entered herein shall remain in full force and 
effect to the extent the same are not in conflict herewith. 
DATED this *2( day of yf64^^. / 2001 
THE COURT: 
DAVID S.::YOUN' 
District". .'Court 
TO FORM 
day of June, 2001, 
M L B G. CHRISTENSEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
